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Abstract 
This paper aims to quantify the link between financialisation and financial instability, 
controlling for the financial and macroeconomic environment. Our main identification 
assumption is to represent these two concepts as a system of simultaneous joint data 
generating processes whose error terms are correlated. Based on panel data for EU countries 
from 1998, we test the null hypotheses that financialisation positively affects financial 
instability -a vulnerability effect- and that financial instability has a negative effect on 
financialisation -a trauma effect-, using Seemingly Unrelated Regressions and 3SLS. We find 
a positive causal effect of credit/GDP on non-performing loans - a vulnerability effect- in the 
EU as a whole, in the Eurozone, in the core of the EU but not at its periphery, and a negative 
effect of non-performing loans on credit/GDP - a trauma effect - in all samples. Even when 
relaxing our identification assumption, both opposite effects hold.  
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1. Introduction 
 
The objective of this paper is to assess the interrelationships between financialisation and 
financial instability. The global financial crisis has shed light on the intertwining between the 
growth of the banking and financial sectors (financial deepening), financial deregulation (or 
absence of regulation in the case of wholesale financial markets) and financial instability (see 
Gorton and Metrick, 2012). The former two concepts (deepening and deregulation) are 
usually considered as two prominent aspects of financialisation (Sawyer, 2014) which, at the 
macroeconomic level, is often associated to the level of bank credit to GDP. Because the 
European Union (EU), under the initiative of the European Commission, has adopted a 
banking union which gives the European Central Bank (ECB) a role of prudential supervisor 
for most banks in the EU, the ECB is de facto in charge of monitoring financialisation and 
financial stability.1 Assessing their intertwining precisely for EU countries is an important 
issue in this context. We additionally focus on the potential heterogeneity of this link within 
the EU between Eurozone (EZ), core EU and periphery EU countries and question the 
relevance of a “one-size-fits-all” reform of banking supervision in the EU.  
 
Although the determinants of bank credit to GDP have been largely investigated in the 
empirical and theoretical literature (see infra), the relationship between bank credit and 
financial instability has been rarely studied to our knowledge. One reason for this is the 
difficulty to quantitatively capture the concept of financial instability, and we assume that 
the most relevant candidate when analysing bank credit should be the share of non-
performing loans to gross loans (see Cihak and Schaeck, 2010). Figure 1 shows a scatter plot 
of the latter variable and bank credit to GDP. The relationship is unclear and the raw 
correlation is -0.23. The contribution of this paper is to assess their conditional correlation 
and to single out the causal effect of each of these two variables on the other, for EU 
countries, imposing a panel structure on data and controlling for financial and 
macroeconomic environments. Our specification includes long-term real interest rates, taxes, 
a financial regulation index and market capitalisation, as well as inflation, real GDP and 
trade openness, all potential determinants of financialisation, as shown in the literature, and 
also possible determinants of financial instability.  
 
Figure 1 – Financialisation and Financial Instability (Source: GFDD) 
 																																																								
1 The rationale for the EU banking union is discussed in Constancio (2014). 
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The main identification assumption of this paper is to represent financialisation and financial 
instability as a system of simultaneous joint data generating processes (estimated with 
Seemingly Unrelated Regressions (SUR)) whose contemporaneous error terms are correlated. 
We test the following two null hypotheses: (i) there is a positive effect of financialisation on 
financial instability labelled a “vulnerability effect” and (ii) there is a negative effect of 
financial instability on financialisation that we label a “trauma effect”. The first hypothesis	
would stem from the increasing fragility and risks of marginal loans, whereas the second 
would result from the potential deleveraging and reduced risk-taking of banks following a 
period of financial instability. In a second step and because our different variables of interest 
on the right-hand-side of our model might potentially be endogenous, we perform three-
stage least squares (3SLS) estimation which enable us to combine the system estimation of 
SUR to the instrumental-variables method of 2SLS. We limit our empirical investigation to 
the period 1998-2012 for which we have access to macroeconomic, banking and market data 
for most of the EU countries. On this period, we can split the sample to characterize the 
interrelationships in the EZ, in the EU core and periphery.  
 
Despite the raw negative correlation between financialisation and financial instability, we 
find a positive causal effect of the level of bank credit to GDP on the share of non-performing 
loans, and a negative causal effect of financial instability on financialisation. These results are 
robust to alternative financial instability variables, to the introduction of government debts,2 
to some EU subsamples, and to non-linear specifications. More precisely, we find the 
existence of a vulnerability effect in the EU as a whole, in the Eurozone, in the core of the EU 
but not at its periphery, and of a trauma effect in all samples. We also find some evidence of 
non-linearities between the two main variables. Whereas non-performing loans have the 
same linear effect on credit to GDP whatever the specification, the effect of credit to GDP on 
non-performing loans –the vulnerability effect– appears state and time contingent. It 
depends on and is reinforced by the level of credit to GDP and on the level of non-
performing loans, and appears to kick in during crisis times rather than during good times.  
 
We also investigate a market view of financialisation which draws on different 
characteristics than the credit view. The market view confirms the vulnerability effect in 
most cases; meanwhile, it gives rise to a distinction between the EU core and periphery 
countries as regards the trauma effect: the vulnerability effect remains whereas the trauma 
effect disappears in all samples, except the EU core countries. In the EU periphery, the 
vulnerability effect is concomitant with a reverse trauma effect.  
 
Finally, even when relaxing our main identification assumption and performing individual 
panel estimations (pooled OLS, fixed- and random-effects) rather than joint ones over the 
entire sample of countries, both opposite effects hold. 
 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the literature. Section 3 
describes the model, our empirical strategy and our hypotheses. Section 4 presents the data. 
Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
  
																																																								
2 The introduction of European government debts in the analysis is an indirect test of their link with banking risk. 
The contagion between sovereign default risk and bank vulnerability has been investigated by Bolton and Jeanne 
(2011), Caruana and Avdjiev (2012), Acharya and Steffen (2015) and Acharya et al. (forthcoming). 
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2. Related literature 
 
This analysis refers to two strands of the existing literature. The first relates to bank credit 
and its determinants. Bernanke and Blinder (1988) revived the empirical literature on bank 
credit and its determinants after they extended the IS/LM model to include a banking sector, 
drawing on the assumption made by Tobin (1970) that bonds and credits are not perfect 
substitutes. They conclude that periods of money-demand and credit-demand shocks 
alternated between 1974 and 1985. The following literature expanded on the analysis of 
monetary policy channels of transmission, whereas the empirical determinants of bank 
credits were usually limited to economic activity and financing costs (e.g. Fase, 1995).   
 
In the 2000s, the bulk of empirical papers about bank credit devoted attention to its impact 
on economic growth (see Ang, 2008, for a survey) whereas only a few papers investigated 
bank credit determinants. After Goodhart (1995), and drawing on a cointegrating VAR 
model of real credit to the private non-financial sector, real GDP, real interest rate and real 
property prices, Hofmann (2004) shows that shocks to property prices could explain the 
persistence in financial cycles. Cottarelli, Dell’Ariccia and Vladkova-Hollar (2005) study the 
bank credit growth in Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) and test whether it 
could be attributed to a structural change of financial deepening. Their list of bank credit 
determinants includes public debt to GDP ratio, GDP per capita, an indicator of high 
inflation, an indicator of financial liberalization, and different institutional characteristics like 
accounting standards, legal origins and bank entry requirements. Except for the latter, all 
variables have the significant expected sign. Aisen and Franken (2010) explain real credit 
growth in 83 countries, with a distinction between, first, variables of economic performance, 
external shocks and policy stance; second, local characteristics of the credit market (like size, 
integration, and openness); and, third, bank characteristics per se (like share of public 
ownership, bank leverage, and bank return on equity). Despite this long list of variables, 
only a few are significant: namely, GDP growth and changes in money market rate. After 
having taken into consideration possible interactions between regions, trading partners’ 
GDP growth rate of emerging Asia can be added to the list of significant determinants.  
 
A recent survey of determinants of domestic bank credit in emerging economies can be 
found in Gozgor (2014) who focuses his empirical study on the role of external factors. Chinn 
and Ito (2006) also discuss this role, relating it to capital controls and institutions, thus 
questioning the relationship between financial openness and financial development. Aiyar, 
Calomiris and Wieladek (2014) investigate the supply of credit and its linkages with (and 
leakages towards) credit substitution channels via foreign affiliates and branches to comply 
with macro-prudential measures.  
 
The literature on financial instability and its determinants has developed more or less along 
two different lines of reasoning. The first one assumes that capitalism is intrinsically unstable 
(Minsky, 1995) and leads to leverage and credit booms and busts. The second one sticks to a 
general equilibrium approach and assumes that financial instability is caused by financial 
frictions (due to asymmetric information), hence by financial shocks and their propagation to 
the rest of the economy (Calomiris, 1995; Mishkin, 1999). In contrast with the literature on 
bank credit determinants, empirical papers dedicated to financial stability determinants have 
been scarcer, to our knowledge. The reason can certainly be related to the difficulty of 
defining and quantifying this concept. Different measures have emerged in the literature. 
Loayza and Ranciere (2006) measure financial instability as the standard deviation of the 
growth rate of the private credit/GDP ratio over non-overlapping 5-year averages. The ECB 
has developed a Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) for the euro area as a whole, 
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available since 1999. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has developed a financial stress 
index for 13 industrialized countries. At the micro level, several authors capture financial 
stability in the banking sector through the Z-score (Uhde and Heimeshoff, 2009; Fink et al., 
2009), which measures the probability of default for a bank or a banking system. The share of 
non-performing loans in bank balance sheets is also used as a proxy of financial instability 
(Cihak and Schaeck, 2010), as it can trigger the onset of a banking crisis (Reinhart and Rogoff, 
2011). Louzis, Vouldis and Metaxas (2012) study the macroeconomic and bank-specific 
determinants of non-performing loans in Greece, and find that they mostly respond to GDP, 
unemployment, interest rates and public debt.    
 
Our contribution to the literature is to estimate simultaneously the interrelationships of bank 
credit and financial instability. We introduce financial instability as an explanatory variable 
of bank credit to GDP and the opposite, controlling for the main determinants put forward 
by the existing literature.  
 
3. Model and Empirical Strategy 
 
When assessing the link between financialisation and financial instability, we face the issue 
of potential endogeneity between our two variables of interest. One solution, and this is the 
main identification assumption of this paper, consists in thinking the problem not in a single-
equation space, but as a system of simultaneous equations that jointly determine both 
dependent variables. The two equations are therefore mechanically related as the 
contemporaneous errors associated with each dependent variable are correlated, which 
seems a reasonable assumption for the two data processes.  
 
Estimating the system provides estimates that are more efficient, because it takes into 
account the correlation between the error terms and therefore add information on the error 
structure. The most basic form of joint-system estimation is Seemingly Unrelated 
Regressions (SUR), also called Zellner (1962)-efficient regressions, using feasible generalised 
least-squares (FGLS). When the two equations do not have the same set of explanatory 
variables and are not nested, it leads to more efficient estimates than estimating each 
individual equation separately with OLS. Generally, the coefficients are only slightly 
different, but the standard errors are uniformly larger. 
 
We estimate simultaneously the cross-effects of financialisation and financial instability 
using the following model, in which we assess the contribution of our variables of interest 
beyond financial and macro controls and the information captured by the lagged value of 
our dependent variables: 
 
൜ܨ௜,௧ ൌ ߙி ൅ ߚிܨ௜,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚிௌ ௜ܵ,௧ ൅ ߚி௑ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߚி௓ܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߝி,௧
௜ܵ,௧ ൌ ߙௌ ൅ ߚௌ ௜ܵ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߚௌிܨ௜,௧ ൅ ߚௌ௑ ௜ܺ,௧ ൅ ߚௌ௓ܼ௜,௧ ൅ ߝௌ,௧         (1) 
 
where Fi,t is the financialisation variable for a country i, Si,t is the financial instability variable, 
Xi,t is the vector of financial controls, namely long-term real interest rates, the stock market 
capitalisation, taxes and a financial regulation variable, and Zi,t is the vector capturing the 
macroeconomic environment, namely real GDP, inflation, trade openness and country and 
time fixed effects. Using this model, we test two hypotheses: 
 
Hypothesis n°1: there is a positive effect of financialisation on financial instability 
labelled a “vulnerability effect”, as suggested by Gorton and Metrick (2012) or 
Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012), where the latter assert that financial vulnerabilities 
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stem from high credit to GDP ratio. These vulnerabilities would stem from the 
increasing fragility and risks of marginal loans. This effect may also arise from the 
dependence of loan-loss provisioning to the evolution of bank lending. Pool et al. 
(forthcoming) show that banks reduce their loan-loss provisioning as a percentage of 
their total assets when bank lending increases,  and therefore take on more risks. 
 
Hypothesis n°2: there is a negative effect of financial instability on financialisation that 
we label a “trauma effect”, and which would result from the potential deleveraging 
and reduced risk-taking of banks following a period of financial instability. 
 
We include financial variables in the regression that could impinge on the relationships 
between financialisation and financial instability.3 For instance, we would expect a negative 
effect of long-term real interest rates measuring financing costs on financialisation assuming 
that credit demand decreases and credit supply increases with interest rates and that the 
equilibrium on the credit market is driven by its short side. Fase (1995) reports results on 
financialisation for the Netherlands using nominal long-term interest rates. Alternatively, we 
focus on real long-term interest rates. We would expect a positive correlation between the 
long-term real interest rate and financial instability: the latter materializes after real interest 
rates go up, hence weakening debtors’ positions. A negative link between stock market 
capitalisation and financialisation would capture a substitution effect between banking 
intermediation and direct financing through financial market operations inducing a negative 
correlation between stock market capitalisation and financial instability as substitution 
should act as an insurance mechanism. We expect a positive link between taxes and 
financialisation and between taxes and financial instability. As regards the former link, the 
argument would come from the development of financial innovation for tax optimization 
and/or because of the deduction of interest payments from profits. The second link would 
proceed along the following logic: the higher the corporate tax, the higher the incentive to 
borrow (to grasp the full benefit of interest payments’ deduction), the lower equity, the 
weaker banks, and the more unstable the banking and financial system. Stated differently, 
and following Keen and De Mooj (2012) and De Mooj, Keene and Orihara (2013), the 
corporate tax would violate the Modigliani-Miller theorem in the case of banking 
institutions: the high corporate tax induces recourse to borrowing (debt) at the expense of 
equity. Finally, we control for the existence of a positive link between financial deregulation 
and financialisation and a positive link between financial deregulation and financial 
instability as deregulation may increase risk-taking. Chinn and Ito (2006) report a positive 
relationship between financial openness and financial development, whereas Tressel and 
Detragiache (2008) show that financial reforms (or financial liberalisation) have a limited 
impact on financial development, conditional on the existence of checks and balances on 
political power. Finally, Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) show that financial liberalization 
generates financial instability in the short run. 
 
In addition, we control for the effect of macroeconomic variables like the GDP growth rate, 
the inflation rate, and trade openness on bank credit and financial stability. Hofmann (2004) 
shows that a shock to real GDP can increase credit, e.g. in Germany, Ireland or Finland; or it 
can have no effect, e.g. in the USA, UK and Japan. Louzis et al. (2012) report a negative 
impact of GDP growth on non-performing loans. Finally, Gozgor (2014) provides evidence of 
a positive link between trade openness and bank credit. 
																																																								
3 Another interesting variable would have been the degree of securitization, enabling to have credit to GDP and 
non-performing loans corrected for securitization, so capturing all loans issued and not only those still on banks’ 
balance sheet. Unfortunately, to our knowledge, such data is not available for our sample.  
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Two other issues, related to the onset of the global financial crisis and its European sequel, 
the sovereign-debt crisis, require some attention. First, the crisis has revealed the divergence 
between the Eurozone and the late newcomers in the EU, where the former have benefited 
from financial deepening for decades whereas the latter are in a process of financial 
development. The crisis has also revealed the gap between a core of EU countries and the 
periphery. These regional features may impinge on the relationship between financialisation 
and financial instability and require a specific investigation. Second, growing public debts 
may affect credit demand and crowd out some investments as well as it may deteriorate the 
balance sheets of banks and thus modify credit supply and increase risks in the banking and 
financial system. Therefore, we test these potential effects coming from fiscal variables by 
introducing government debts. 
 
4. Data 
 
4.1 Dependent variables 
 
In our joint system framework, we intend to explain both financialisation and financial 
instability. We consider the financial deepening dimension to measure the financialisation 
concept. This is usually measured through the share of private credit in the economy. More 
precisely, we use the private credit by deposit money banks and other financial institutions 
to GDP ratio (%) of the Global Financial Development Database (GFDD) of the World Bank. 
We also use the deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) as another measure of financial 
deepening. Adopting a stock market view of financialisation, we also introduce the turnover 
ratio (Beck and Levine, 2004) or the market capitalisation. Financial instability is captured 
with an aggregate prudential ratio which is the ratio of non-performing loans to gross loans, 
which is the most common variable used for credit markets and relevant as a warning signal 
for systemic banking insolvency (Cihak and Schaeck, 2010). We also test a stock market 
volatility variable, and make use of the Saint Louis Fed Financial Stress Index (STLFSI)4 and 
the Composite Indicator of Systemic Stress (CISS) developed by the ECB for the euro area as 
instruments in our robustness section. The CISS includes 15 raw measures, mainly of market-
based financial stress, which are split equally into five categories, namely the financial 
intermediaries sector, money markets, equity markets, bond markets and foreign exchange 
markets. The CISS places relatively more weight on situations in which stress prevails 
simultaneously in several market segments. It is unit-free and constrained to lie within the 
unit interval (see Hollo et al., 2012). Unfortunately, the latter two aggregate indicators exist 
neither at the country level nor for the entire EU. However, thanks to strong financial, 
monetary and trade integration in the EU, it seems reasonable to assume that the evolution 
of macroeconomic financial instability in the EU is highly correlated with financial instability 
in the euro area. 
 
4.2 Explanatory variables  
 
We include two types of explanatory variables in our empirical model. First, GDP growth, 
the inflation rate and trade openness are included to control for the macroeconomic 
environment. Second, we include financial variables enabling us to control for factors that 
should affect our two variables of interest. Credit costs are captured by long-term real 
interest rates. The substitution effect between direct and indirect finance is tested with the 
																																																								
4 We acknowledge that the STLFSI is constructed on US data, but because financial markets are the most 
integrated market, at least much further than labour, goods or credit markets, we assume that this index could act 
as another relevant proxy for instability on financial markets in Europe. 
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stock market capitalisation or with the stock market turnover ratio. We assess the link 
between financialisation, financial instability and taxes by using different measures of tax 
policies. Our benchmark measure is cyclically adjusted direct taxes on business. We also 
examine alternatively the ratio of total direct taxes to GDP, the ratio of capital taxes to GDP, 
and the ratio of cyclically adjusted taxes on production and imports to GDP. On the fiscal 
side, we consider the ratio of gross public debt to GDP. Finally, to isolate the effect of 
deregulation, we include an index of financial reform, or alternatively the level of bank 
regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets (%). All variables are described in Table A in the 
Appendix and descriptive statistics are presented in Table B. 
 
4.3 Subsample definitions 
 
To take into account the heterogeneity into the EU, we decompose the sample into several 
subsamples. First, we distinguish the Eurozone (EZ), composed of the 12 first member states 
of the euro area, leaving aside Luxembourg where the financial deepening is so strong as to 
make this small country an outlier. Second, the sovereign debt crisis highlighted the 
fragmentation in the Eurozone and in the EU. We then disentangle member states that 
belong to the core of the EU and member states that are more at the periphery. This 
separation is based on the spread between the long term sovereign interest rates and the 
money market rate. The composition of these sub-samples is available in Table C in the 
appendix together with a comparison of the mean of the benchmark variables for the core 
and the periphery (Table D). A few comments are worth mentioning. First, according to the 
method chosen for disentangling the core and the periphery, Spain and Italy are included in 
the periphery of the EU. Second, the UK is part of the core. 5  Third, the pronounced 
differences in the variables of the core and the periphery of the EU suggest our grouping is 
reasonable. On the one hand, non-performing loans, taxes on business, inflation and growth 
are on average higher in the periphery than in the core. On the other hand, credits to GDP 
and market capitalization are on average higher in the core than in the periphery.    
 
5. Results 
 
5.1 Baseline 
 
Starting with our first hypothesis of a vulnerability effect, Table 1 shows that financialisation 
is a positive and significant determinant of financial instability. This is also true with or 
without the controls, but their inclusion reduces the magnitude of the effects. When 
including them, the coefficient is equal to 0.14 and is significant at the 5% level. According to 
our second hypothesis of a trauma effect, Table 1 shows that financial instability (non-
performing loans in % of all loans) has a negative effect on financialisation (bank credit to 
GDP6). This is true with or without the financial and macro controls and the coefficient is 
equal to -0.14 and significant at the 1% level. Since all variables have been normalised, this 
means that a 1-standard-deviation increase in non-performing loans (namely, an increase of 
5 percentage points of the share of non-performing loans) reduces credit to GDP of 0.14 s.d. 
or 8 percentage points.  
 
																																																								
5 Usually in the literature, the distinction between the core and the periphery focuses on the Eurozone. A study 
about the linkages between financialisation and financial stability requires the inclusion of more countries and 
especially the UK in the corresponding subsample.  
6 As a robustness test, we also introduced the deposit banks assets as another measure of financialisation. Results 
remain robust. 
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We also assess in Table 1 the potential non-linear relations between financialisation and 
financial instability. We first introduce squared values of each variable of interest as an 
explanatory variable of the other (column 3). We find that non-performing loans have the 
same linear effect on credit to GDP whatever its level, while the effect of credit to GDP on 
non-performing loans –the vulnerability effect– is larger for high values of the credit to GDP 
ratio. We then look at the cross-effects of each variable on the other by introducing an 
interaction term of the lagged dependent variable with the variable of interest (column 4). 
Once again, it happens that the effect of non-performing loans on credit to GDP does not 
depend on the value of credit to GDP, whereas the effect of credit to GDP on non-performing 
loans clearly depends on the value of non-performing loans. Finally, we consider the time-
contingency of the effect and we interact the variable of interest with a dummy for the crisis 
(column 5). The effect of non-performing loans on credit to GDP has not been altered during 
the financial crisis, whereas the vulnerability effect appears to kick in during crisis times 
rather than during good times. Interestingly, the crisis does not have an impact by itself. 
High levels of credit/GDP together with the occurrence of the crisis fuel financial instability. 
  
We then look at these estimates for subgroups of countries (Table 2). The trauma effect is 
confirmed for the Eurozone, and core and periphery countries, however the effect is more 
than twice higher in core than periphery countries. Interestingly, there is a divergence for the 
vulnerability effect between the Eurozone and core countries on one side and periphery 
countries on the other side: financialisation has no incidence on financial instability in the 
latter. This may proceed from different stages of financialisation between the core and the 
periphery of the EU and shed light on the threshold impact of credit to GDP ratios on 
financial instability discussed in the previous paragraph.  
 
The coefficient associated to the lagged value of our dependent variables is in all cases very 
significant and accounts for the persistence of these processes. More broadly, we find in 
Tables 1 and 2, that long-term real interest rates have no impact on credit to GDP and a 
positive impact on non-performing loans, a correlation which we also find in the Eurozone 
countries and in the periphery countries but not in the core ones. One possible interpretation 
of these impacts may be that long-term real interest rates have both positive effects on the 
supply side of credits and negative effects on the demand side that offset each other and 
explain the absence of any impact on the bank credit to GDP ratio. Nevertheless high interest 
rates would reveal the fragility of the weakest debtors (which are in the EU periphery), 
increase the share of non-performing loans and trigger financial instability. The substitution 
effect between bank intermediation and financial markets does not appear in the data: stock 
market capitalisation has no significant impact on financialisation. In addition, the stock 
market capitalisation has no effect on non-performing loans. Both results are confirmed for 
subgroups. It appears that direct taxes on business are negatively correlated with financial 
instability, but this result seems mainly driven by core countries. Finally, the index of 
financial reform is neither correlated with financialisation nor with financial instability. This 
is true for all subsamples of countries. The former result is consistent with Tressel and 
Detragiache (2008). 
 
As far as macro control variables are concerned, we find evidence that the GDP growth rate 
is negatively correlated to the credit to GDP ratio and to non-performing loans. The former 
result might be related to different degrees of financialisation in the EU and might therefore 
be related to the convergence effect: most developed economies in the EU share the most 
developed banking and financial systems; hence, these developed countries with relatively 
low GDP growth rates would show the most dynamic credit to GDP ratio, whereas least-
developed ones would have the least dynamic. This argument is confirmed after the core 
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and the periphery countries are tested separately: the GDP growth rate has an impact on 
credit to GDP ratios in the (least-financialised) periphery, but not in the (most-financialised) 
core (Table 2). The negative impact of the growth rate on non-performing loans would also 
match the argument of the convergence effect: the pace of growth in the least-developed-
least financialised countries would not produce the same increase in risk-taking by banks 
and on financial markets as in the most-developed-most-financialised economies. In a highly 
financialised area, the smaller economic growth rate would be synonymous of riskier credit, 
generating a rise in non-performing loans.7 The relative magnitude of the coefficients in 
Table 2 sheds some light on this issue though parameters are not statistically different. 
Evidence on the positive impact of inflation on financial instability is strong, but driven only 
by periphery countries. The absence of an effect of inflation on financial instability in the 
Eurozone is consistent with Blot et al. (2015) who find that there is no stable and clear link 
between financial stability and price stability in the Eurozone. Finally, trade openness is not 
correlated to credit to GDP or financial instability.8  
 
We enlarge, in Table 3, the scope of common determinants of financialisation and financial 
instability to government debt. First, our previous results about the vulnerability effect still 
hold. Second, it appears that public debt to GDP ratios have a positive effect on financial 
instability in the EZ and core EU countries. However, if we decompose this effect between 
normal times and crisis times, it seems that this effect of government debt on financial 
instability happens only during crisis and that the effect is null (EZ and core EU countries) or 
even negative (all countries or periphery EU countries) in normal times. This is consistent 
with the analysis of Caruana and Avdjiev (2012) and with the home bias in periphery 
countries that Acharya and Steffen (2015) reveal. Meanwhile, the trauma effect is no longer 
statistically significant in the Eurozone and EU core countries, and public debt to GDP ratios 
are negatively correlated to financialisation except for periphery EU countries. This supports 
the argument of a possible direct crowding-out effect in the core or of an indirect one in the 
periphery through the positive effect of higher public debt on financial instability which may 
push banks to reduce their supply of credits and to deleverage. This is consistent with 
Cantero-Saiz et al. (2014)‘s conclusion that banks in high sovereign risk EU countries 
reduced their credit supply more when monetary policy is tight. 
 
5.2 Estimating causal effects 
 
So far, we have jointly estimated a set of equations assuming that they have no endogenous 
regressors. However, it is likely that our different variables of interest on the right-hand-side 
of equations are endogenous. Using three-stage least squares (3SLS or SUR-IV) enables to to 
combine the system estimation of SUR with the instrumental variables method of 2SLS so as 
to get a consistent estimator of equations with endogenous regressors. The 3SLS estimator 
works in 3 steps: 1. we calculate fitted values of the endogenous variables based on the 
reduced-form regressions on the exogenous variables as in 2SLS, 2. we estimate the 
individual equations by 2SLS, using their fitted values in place of the endogenous regressors, 
3. we estimate the system of equations jointly by GLS. 
 
Identification depends on two main assumptions: that the instrument does not itself appear 
in the equation, and that the instrument does appear in another equation that influences the 
																																																								
7 The effect may also stem from the variation of loan-loss provisioning due to bank lending dynamics. Pool et al. 
(forthcoming) show that banks decrease provisioning when bank lending increases. 
8 This result is confirmed when replacing trade openness by an index measuring countries’ degree of capital 
account openness, defined by Chinn and Ito (2006). 
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endogenous regressor. This means that there needs to be one omitted exogenous variable for 
each included endogenous variable. There are two ways to assess the relevance of our 
instrumental variables. They should explain a significant share of the variation in the 
endogenous regressor, and they should be exogenous to the dependent variables, or in other 
words, they should not be correlated with the dependent variables except through their 
effects on the endogenous regressors. We therefore provide the R² of the regression of the 
3SLS residuals on the instruments (the Sargan test equivalent) to assess their relevance and 
they confirm the validity of our instruments. 
 
Results of estimations with SUR-IV are reported in Table 4. We instrument non-performing 
loans by the CISS, the stock market volatility and the STLFSI (columns 1 to 3), while we 
instrument credit to GDP by assets to GDP, the turnover ratio and the market capitalisation 
(columns 4 to 6) so as to ensure the robustness of our results over different instruments. 
These estimations point to robust interrelationships between financialisation and financial 
instability and to robust correlations to macro control variables, GDP growth in the equation 
of credit to GDP and GDP growth and inflation in the equation of non-performing loans. In 
this latter equation, the correlations to the long-term interest rate and to taxes on business are 
also robust.  
 
There is indeed a negative causal impact of non-performing loans on credit to GDP and a 
positive causal impact of credit to GDP on non-performing loans, suggesting that the 
“trauma” and “vulnerability” effects put forward are at work.   
 
5.3 The stock market view of financialisation 
 
Until then, we have only taken into account one dimension of financialisation, the credit 
view, whereas another dimension, the stock market view, could also be analysed. It is worth 
noting that in the EU the two views are not interchangeable as they do not capture exactly 
the same relationships because of a selection bias: households and small and mid-sized 
corporations do not have the same access to financial markets as large corporations. 
However, as Beck and Levine (2004) pointed out, financial deepening can also be measured 
through the turnover ratio which proxies the depth and liquidity of stock markets, while 
financial instability is captured with the stock market volatility.  
 
Table 5 reports the estimates with this new set of variables. The opposite effects between 
financial instability and financialisation are still captured with some subsample limitations 
though. On the one hand, the turnover ratio positively affects stock market volatility, except 
in core EU countries. This suggests that the vulnerability effect is not contingent on the 
definition of financialisation. On the other hand, stock market volatility has a negative effect 
on the depth and liquidity of financial markets (the turnover ratio) in core EU countries only, 
confirming there the trauma effect. Surprisingly, stock market volatility has a positive effect 
on the turnover ratio in periphery EU countries. This effect may capture the still on-going 
development of financial markets in this part of the EU.  
 
5.4 Relaxing the main identification assumption 
 
Finally, we provide estimates suggesting how our identification assumption affects the main 
results. Therefore we move from the estimation of a joint system of equations to a single-
equation space, namely the estimation of 2 individual panel equations (Table 6) where the 
error terms of both financialisation and financial instability processes are considered 
independently. We perform pooled OLS, as well as fixed- and random-effects estimations. It 
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is striking to note that the previous outcomes for both hypotheses still hold. Non-performing 
loans are a significant negative determinant of bank credit to GDP, while the level of bank 
credit to GDP is a significant positive determinant of the share of non-performing loans to 
gross loans. Moreover, other financial and macro determinants of financialisation and 
financial instability which were statistically significant in the benchmark model remain so. 
The results about a vulnerability effect and a trauma effect in the EU are thus robust to our 
identification assumption. 
 
6. Conclusion 
 
We represent financialisation and financial instability as a system of simultaneous joint data 
generating processes (estimated with Seemingly Unrelated Regressions) whose error terms 
are correlated and find that financialisation positively affects financial instability –the 
vulnerability effect– and financial instability negatively affects financialisation –the trauma 
effect–. We find evidence of some non-linearities between the two variables. Whereas non-
performing loans have the same linear effect on credit to GDP, the effect of credit to GDP on 
non-performing loans –the vulnerability effect– appears state and time contingent. It 
depends on and is reinforced by the level of credit to GDP and on the level of non-
performing loans, and appears to kick in during crisis times rather than during good times. 
In addition, the positive effect of financial deepening –measured with the turnover ratio– on 
financial instability and the negative effect of stock market volatility on financialisation are 
also found when considering the market view of financialisation rather than the credit one. 
Finally, even when relaxing our identification assumption, the level of bank credit to GDP 
remains a significant positive determinant of the level of non-performing loans (as a 
percentage of all loans), while financial instability has a negative effect on financialisation. 
 
The existence of a vulnerability effect in the EU as a whole, in the Eurozone, in the core of the 
EU but not at its periphery, and of a trauma effect in all samples raises some policy 
recommendations. First, the existence of both effects confirms the requirement to control and 
supervise the supply of bank credits in the Eurozone and core countries of the EU. 
According to our results, monitoring bank credits, via policies which remain to be discussed 
– e.g. a change in capital adequacy ratios -, would alleviate the risks of financial instability. 
Second, in the EU periphery countries, the variations in long-term interest rates and inflation 
play a strong role in the rise of financial instability: hence, supervising bank credits in the 
periphery, within the Banking union, should be complemented with macroeconomic policies 
aimed at achieving low and stable inflation and long-term interest rates.  
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Table 1: Benchmark 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
All All All All All
Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L.
Lag Dep. Var. 0.76*** 0.75*** 0.73*** 0.73*** 0.72***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Credit/GDP 0.26*** 0.14** 0.12** 0.16** 0.04
[0.05] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.08]
(Credit/GDP)² 0.13***
[0.04]
Interaction 0.10**
[0.04]
Credit/GDP * Crisis 0.28**
[0.12]
Crisis -0.01
[0.15]
LT Real IR 0.19*** 0.16** 0.17** 0.20***
[0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07]
Market Cap. 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.03
[0.05] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05]
Tax . Business -0.10** -0.11** -0.09 -0.12***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Fin. Reform -0.02 -0.02 -0.11 -0.12
[0.51] [0.49] [0.50] [0.50]
GDP grow th -0.28*** -0.24*** -0.32*** -0.23***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
Inflation 0.15** 0.13** 0.12** 0.15***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Trade Open. -0.04 -0.05 -0.02 -0.05
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
Lag Dep. Var. 0.88*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.86*** 0.84***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Non-Perf L. -0.10*** -0.14*** -0.14*** -0.13*** -0.11**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05]
(Non-Perf L.)² 0.01
[0.03]
Interaction -0.05
[0.03]
Non-Perf L. * Crisis -0.03
[0.07]
Crisis 0.17
[0.11]
LT Real IR 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Market Cap. 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.03
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Tax . Business 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Fin. Reform -0.41 -0.4 -0.34 -0.33
[0.36] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36]
GDP grow th -0.19*** -0.19*** -0.18*** -0.16***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Inflation 0.01 0.00 0.02 -0.01
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Trade Open. 0.02 0.01 0.02 0
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Country /Time/Cst Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 275 182 182 182 182
R²_1 0.61 0.75 0.76 0.75 0.76
R²_2 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.88 0.89
Standard errors in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimated from equation (1). All variables
are normalised by country. The interaction term is between the lag of the dependent variable
and non-performing loans in the upper panel, and credit/GDP in the lower panel.
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Table 2: Geographical zones 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All EZ Core Periphery
Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L.
Lag Dep. Var. 0.75*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.73***
[0.04] [0.05] [0.06] [0.07]
Credit/GDP 0.14** 0.23*** 0.17** 0.05
[0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.11]
LT Real IR 0.19*** 0.22*** 0.05 0.27***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.18] [0.08]
Market Cap. 0.01 -0.02 0.05 0.01
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05]
Tax . Business -0.10** -0.07 -0.20** -0.08
[0.04] [0.05] [0.08] [0.06]
Fin. Reform -0.02 0.64 0.32 0.04
[0.51] [0.57] [0.79] [0.73]
GDP grow th -0.28*** -0.20*** -0.31*** -0.26***
[0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08]
Inflation 0.15** 0.11 0.13 0.18***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.12] [0.07]
Trade Open. -0.04 -0.03 0.00 -0.04
[0.05] [0.06] [0.11] [0.06]
Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
Lag Dep. Var. 0.86*** 0.94*** 0.89*** 0.89***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
Non-Perf L. -0.14*** -0.11*** -0.19*** -0.08**
[0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.04]
LT Real IR 0.02 0.03 0.01 -0.01
[0.05] [0.05] [0.13] [0.04]
Market Cap. 0.03 0.06 0.02 0.04
[0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.03]
Tax . Business 0.01 0.05 -0.04 0.05
[0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.03]
Fin. Reform -0.41 -0.04 0.05 -0.07
[0.36] [0.33] [0.59] [0.39]
GDP grow th -0.19*** -0.24*** -0.27*** -0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Inflation 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
[0.04] [0.04] [0.09] [0.04]
Trade Open. 0.02 0.06 0.06 0.00
[0.04] [0.04] [0.08] [0.03]
Country /Time/Cst Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 182 126 92 90
R²_1 0.75 0.77 0.71 0.82
R²_2 0.88 0.92 0.86 0.95
Standard errors in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimated from equation (1). A ll
variables are normalised by country. 
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Table 3: Introducing government debt 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
All EZ Core Periphery All EZ Core Periphery
Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L.
Lag Dep. Var. 0.72*** 0.70*** 0.65*** 0.74*** 0.69*** 0.71*** 0.63*** 0.70***
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.04] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Credit/GDP 0.18*** 0.28*** 0.22*** 0.02 0.14** 0.25*** 0.20*** -0.13
[0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.11] [0.06] [0.08] [0.07] [0.11]
Gov . Debt 0.08 0.15** 0.16** -0.08 -0.21*** -0.12 -0.12 -0.50***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.07] [0.10] [0.08] [0.14] [0.10] [0.13]
Gov . Debt * Crisis 0.48*** 0.35** 0.47*** 0.66***
[0.10] [0.15] [0.14] [0.15]
Crisis 0.36** 0.3 0.34 0.55***
[0.14] [0.20] [0.23] [0.18]
LT Real IR 0.17*** 0.18** 0.07 0.31*** 0.21*** 0.17** 0.13 0.31***
[0.07] [0.08] [0.17] [0.09] [0.06] [0.08] [0.18] [0.08]
Market Cap. 0.02 0.02 0.08 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.05 0.00
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.06] [0.04] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05]
Tax . Business -0.10** -0.06 -0.22*** -0.09 -0.09** -0.05 -0.23*** -0.08
[0.04] [0.05] [0.08] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.07] [0.05]
Fin. Reform -0.02 0.7 0.47 0.02 0.16 0.67 0.3 0.42
[0.50] [0.56] [0.78] [0.73] [0.47] [0.55] [0.73] [0.67]
GDP grow th -0.27*** -0.21*** -0.30*** -0.26*** -0.24*** -0.20*** -0.27*** -0.19**
[0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.08] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Inflation 0.15** 0.11 0.15 0.19*** 0.14** 0.09 0.18 0.12
[0.06] [0.07] [0.11] [0.07] [0.06] [0.07] [0.13] [0.07]
Trade Open. -0.03 -0.03 0.06 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 0.1 -0.01
[0.05] [0.06] [0.11] [0.07] [0.05] [0.06] [0.10] [0.06]
Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
Lag Dep. Var. 0.84*** 0.91*** 0.88*** 0.90*** 0.83*** 0.89*** 0.87*** 0.84***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.06]
Non-Perf L. -0.09** -0.06 -0.10 -0.09** -0.10** -0.06 -0.10 -0.11***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.06] [0.04]
Gov . Debt -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.16*** 0.03 -0.15*** -0.25*** -0.18** -0.07
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.07]
Gov . Debt * Crisis 0.06 0.17 0.02 0.15
[0.07] [0.09] [0.11] [0.08]
Crisis 0.23** 0.26** 0.14 0.43***
[0.10] [0.12] [0.18] [0.09]
LT Real IR 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.02 0.03 0.03 -0.09 0.00
[0.05] [0.05] [0.13] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.14] [0.05]
Market Cap. 0.02 0.03 -0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.04
[0.03] [0.04] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03] [0.04] [0.06] [0.03]
Tax . Business 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.05 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.04
[0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.06] [0.03]
Fin. Reform -0.4 -0.1 -0.13 -0.07 -0.33 -0.1 -0.12 0.05
[0.35] [0.32] [0.57] [0.39] [0.34] [0.32] [0.57] [0.35]
GDP grow th -0.17*** -0.21*** -0.24*** -0.02 -0.14*** -0.19*** -0.23*** 0.03
[0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Inflation 0 -0.01 -0.03 0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.08] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.10] [0.03]
Trade Open. 0.01 0.05 -0.02 -0.01 0 0.04 -0.03 -0.03
[0.04] [0.04] [0.08] [0.03] [0.04] [0.04] [0.08] [0.03]
Country /Time/Cst Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 182 126 92 90 182 126 92 90
R²_1 0.75 0.78 0.72 0.82 0.78 0.79 0.76 0.85
R²_2 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.95 0.89 0.93 0.88 0.96
Standard errors in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimated from equation (1). A ll variables are normalised by country. 
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Table 4: SUR-IV 3SLS estimation 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All All All
Instrumented Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
Add. Instrument CISS Volat STLFSI Asset/GDP Turnov er Market Cap.
Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L.
Lag Dep. Var. 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74*** 0.74***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Credit/GDP 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.27*** 0.26*** 0.26*** 0.26***
[0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08] [0.08]
LT Real IR 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18*** 0.18***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.07]
Market Cap. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Tax . Business -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10** -0.10**
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Fin. Reform 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.04
[0.51] [0.51] [0.51] [0.51] [0.51] [0.51]
GDP grow th -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25*** -0.25***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Inflation 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15** 0.15**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.06]
Trade Open. -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06]
R² 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.01
Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
Lag Dep. Var. 0.89*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90*** 0.90***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Non-Perf L. -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.21*** -0.21*** -0.21***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
LT Real IR 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.05
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Market Cap. 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04 0.04
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Tax . Business 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
[0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Fin. Reform -0.46 -0.46 -0.46 -0.47 -0.47 -0.47
[0.36] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36] [0.36]
GDP grow th -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20*** -0.20***
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Inflation 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.03 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
Trade Open. 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02
[0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04] [0.04]
R² 0.05 0.02 0.05 0.00 0.01 0.02
Country /Time/Cst Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 182 182 182 182 182 182
Standard errors in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimated from equation (1). All variables are normalised by
country. 
Regression of 3SLS residuals on instruments
Regression of 3SLS residuals on instruments
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Table 5: Stock market view of financialisation 
  
(1) (2) (3) (4)
All EZ Core Periphery
Volat Volat Volat Volat
Lag Dep. Var. 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.48*** 0.51***
[0.05] [0.05] [0.07] [0.07]
Turnov er 0.21*** 0.19*** -0.09 0.36***
[0.05] [0.06] [0.08] [0.06]
LT Real IR 0.06 0.1 0.52*** 0.01
[0.07] [0.09] [0.18] [0.09]
Credit/GDP 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.31**
[0.07] [0.09] [0.08] [0.15]
Tax . Business -0.04 -0.01 -0.02 -0.07
[0.05] [0.06] [0.07] [0.08]
Fin. Reform 0.07 -0.04 0.24 0.21
[0.61] [0.68] [0.89] [0.98]
GDP grow th -0.61*** -0.69*** -0.62*** -0.55***
[0.06] [0.08] [0.08] [0.10]
Inflation -0.02 -0.04 0.37*** -0.14
[0.07] [0.08] [0.12] [0.09]
Trade Open. 0 0.07 -0.06 0.02
[0.07] [0.08] [0.12] [0.08]
Turnov er Turnov er Turnov er Turnov er
Lag Dep. Var. 0.53*** 0.51*** 0.49*** 0.34***
[0.06] [0.07] [0.09] [0.11]
Volat 0.01 -0.02 -0.25*** 0.32**
[0.07] [0.09] [0.09] [0.13]
LT Real IR 0.09 0.03 0.44** -0.04
[0.10] [0.12] [0.20] [0.14]
Credit/GDP -0.02 0.03 0.07 -0.19
[0.09] [0.12] [0.09] [0.22]
Tax . Business 0.17** 0.19** 0.15 0.28**
[0.07] [0.08] [0.08] [0.11]
Fin. Reform 0.13 0.07 -0.24 -0.94
[0.77] [0.90] [0.99] [1.41]
GDP grow th 0.31*** 0.31*** 0.14 0.53***
[0.09] [0.11] [0.10] [0.15]
Inflation 0.07 -0.01 0.38*** -0.08
[0.08] [0.10] [0.14] [0.13]
Trade Open. -0.04 -0.05 -0.09 -0.12
[0.09] [0.11] [0.13] [0.12]
Country /Time/Cst Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 200 138 107 93
R²_1 0.64 0.68 0.67 0.65
R²_2 0.40 0.38 0.57 0.32
Standard errors in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimated from
equation (1). A ll variables are normalised by country. 
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Table 6: Alternative estimation methods 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
All All All All All All
Pooled OLS FE RE Pooled OLS FE RE
Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Non-Perf L. Credit/GDP Credit/GDP Credit/GDP
Lag Dep. Var. 0.71*** 0.59*** 0.62*** 0.86*** 0.80*** 0.81***
[0.04] [0.06] [0.05] [0.05] [0.06] [0.05]
Credit/GDP 0.18*** 0.23*** 0.20***
[0.07] [0.07] [0.06]
Non-Perf L. -0.14*** -0.16*** -0.14***
[0.03] [0.05] [0.04]
LT Real IR 0.21*** 0.25*** 0.25*** 0.02 0.01 0.00
[0.07] [0.07] [0.07] [0.05] [0.05] [0.05]
Market Cap. 0.00 -0.02 -0.01 0.03 -0.03 -0.02
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.03] [0.03]
Tax . Business -0.13*** -0.13** -0.14*** 0.01 -0.05 -0.01
[0.05] [0.05] [0.05] [0.03] [0.04] [0.03]
Fin. Reform -0.18 2.69*** -0.59 -0.31 1.01 -0.47
[0.53] [1.02] [0.68] [0.36] [0.76] [0.58]
GDP grow th -0.24*** -0.19*** -0.21*** -0.18*** -0.22*** -0.22***
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.03] [0.03]
Inflation 0.16*** 0.17*** 0.18*** 0.01 -0.01 -0.02
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Trade Open. -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.02 0.11** 0.09**
[0.06] [0.06] [0.06] [0.04] [0.05] [0.04]
Country /Time/Cst Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 186 169 186 188 171 188
R² / R²_w ithin 0.73 0.65 0.75 0.88 0.71 0.88
Standard errors in brackets. ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Estimated from equation (1) but each equation separately. A ll
variables are normalised by country. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table A: Data Description and Sources 
 
 
 
Table B: Descriptive statistics 
 
  
Abbreviation Description Source Frequency
Credit/GDP
Private credit by deposit money banks and other 
financial institutions to GDP (%)
GFDD annual
Non-Perf L. Bank non-performing loans to gross loans (%) GFDD annual
Asset/GDP Deposit money banks' assets to GDP (%) GFDD annual
Turnover Stock market turnover ratio (%) GFDD annual
CISS (composite 
indicator of 
systemic stress)
Index comprising the five most important segments of 
a financial system: bank and non-bank financial 
intermediaries sector, money markets, securities 
markets and foreign exchange markets.
ECB
Weekly 
aggregated 
to annual
STLFSI St. Louis Fed Financial Stress Index FRED annual
Volat Stock price volatility (%) GFDD annual
LT Real IR
Real long term interest rates (difference between long 
term interest rates and inflation)
Authors calculation 
using OECD & WDI 
annual
Market Cap. Market capitalisation of listed companies (% of GDP) WDI annual
Tax. Business Cyclically adjusted direct taxes on business (% of GDP) OECD annual
Gov. Debt Gross public debt, Maastricht criterion, as % of GDP OECD annual
Fin. Reform Index of financial reform IMF annual
Inflation Inflation, consumer prices (annual %) WDI annual
GDP growth GDP growth (annual %) WDI annual
Trade Open. Trade (% of GDP) WDI annual
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Credit/GDP 344 93.12 57.61 6.38 284.62
Non-Perf L. 343 4.75 5.01 0.10 31.60
LT Real IR 277 2.30 2.03 -1.72 21.00
Market Cap. 405 53.80 47.05 2.41 323.66
Tax. Business 278 0.21 0.55 0.01 3.44
Fin. Reform 330 0.92 0.08 0.49 1.00
Inflation 405 3.68 5.16 -4.48 59.10
GDP growth 405 2.55 3.68 -17.95 12.23
Trade Open. 397 110.09 52.52 46.64 333.53
Main variables
Financial controls
Macro controls
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Table C: Subsamples composition 
 
 
 
Table D: Mean of the main variables  
in Core and Periphery subsamples 
	
Eurozone (EZ) Core Periphery
Austria Austria Bulgaria
Belgium Belgium Cyprus
Germany Germany Estonia
Spain Denmark Spain
Finland Finland Greece
France France Hungary
Greece Luxembourg Ireland
Ireland Netherlands Italy
Italy Sweden Lithuania
Netherlands United Kingdom Latvia
Portugal Malta
Poland
Portugal
Romania
Slovenia
Slovakia
Core Periphery
Credit/GDP (% of GDP) 115.83 80.32
Non-Perf L. (%) 2.19 6.32
LT Real IR 2.16 2.46
Market Cap. (% of GDP) 91.05 31.89
Tax. Business (% of GDP) 0.08 0.32
Fin. Reform (index) 0.95 0.90
Inflation (annual %) 1.90 4.72
GDP growth (annual %) 1.96 2.91
Trade Open. (% of GDP) 112.37 108.70
